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[iOS] Vulnerability Exploitation in iOS Devices. SPTM/TXM.dec Analysis and Device Ini

by honeyman1 - 27 October, 2026 - 11:17 PM
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Initial Initialization
  • After power is applied and the device begins booting, SecureROM comes into play first—an immutable code burned into the chip's read-only memory during manufacturing. The entire iOS device boot chain starts with it.

  • Unlike BIOS or UEFI, which can typically be updated, SecureROM cannot be reflashed via a simple system update; it is physically built into the chip at the factory and remains unchanged throughout the device's entire lifecycle.

  • As for the other components you will learn about during the boot process, SecureROM does not need to be verified for authenticity using the same scheme as them (specifically, via a cryptographic hash). The thing is that its code is written to the ROM at the manufacturing stage and cannot be modified by a regular firmware update.

  • You can observe the entire device initialization process in the diagram below:

 
[Image: 686656620-c1e3cd24-e8c7-4bd8-806e-5c02ae...yq2mq2jfrk]
 
 
Strangely enough, the most vulnerable spot here is precisely SecureROM. The main problem is that even if there is a vulnerability in this bootloader's code for a specific iPhone model, it cannot be fixed with a regular system update, precisely because the SecureROM code itself is burned into the chip at the manufacturing stage and cannot be overwritten. Consequently, if a vulnerability allows bypassing authentication at this boot stage, it opens up the possibility for further bypassing the device's security mechanisms.
iBoot.​
  • As I wrote above, SecureROM verifies the authenticity of the next boot component and then hands over control to it. In this case, we are talking about the iBoot bootloader, which is responsible for the subsequent booting of iOS and directly preparing for the launch of the XNU kernel. iBoot is the bootloader responsible for loading the kernel of the iOS operating system—XNU. First of all, it verifies the authenticity and integrity of the kernel image to ensure it has not been modified. Cryptographic signature mechanisms are used for this purpose. In addition to this, iBoot handles the preparation of the device tree, which describes the hardware configuration of a specific device. This is necessary for the kernel to understand what hardware it is working with and what components are available to it.
Let's start by explaining how the device tree works, as it is important to understand this in the context of the iBoot bootloader. The device tree describes the hardware configuration of the device. For example, it may specify the addresses of the WLAN controller registers in the physical address space, the size of the corresponding memory range, and other parameters necessary for operating with a specific device. What does this mean in practice? Suppose we have a WLAN controller through which the device interacts with Wi-Fi; for the kext to work with it, it needs to know where its control and status registers are located. Through these registers, one can, for example, obtain information about the controller's state or control its operation. Naturally, the specific addresses depend on the device model.
 
After booting, the XNU kernel receives the device tree and uses the information contained within it during the discovery and initialization of hardware components, which allows the kernel and corresponding kexts to understand what hardware they are working with and how to access it. The operation is described in more detail in the diagram below:

[Image: 686656619-95c95dff-9c6a-4ce0-8e3e-f03831...JVQDZGvlAE]
 
If we look at Windows, we can see that device drivers are typically loaded as separate modules and run in kernel space. They are not necessarily part of the kernel image itself. This approach has its advantages, but in the context of vulnerability research, we are primarily interested in the fact that drivers are distinct components with their own logic and potential bugs.
In iOS, the approach is somewhat different. In modern versions of the system, kernel components, including numerous kexts (drivers and other kernel modules), can be combined into a single kernelcache image. That is, instead of viewing each kext solely as a separate loadable module, we are dealing with an image that already incorporates the corresponding kernel components. Apple component images are packaged using the IMG4 format. To put it simply, inside we can find IM4P, which contains the component image itself, and IM4M, associated with the manifest and data required to verify its authenticity.


[Image: 686656615-aaa103a7-f15a-4cc5-b9bc-313049...9btZ-jr-Ps]

Mach-O Format

In Windows, drivers, DLLs, and other necessary executable files are described by the Portable Executable (PE) format. It describes sections, the import/export table, base relocations, and headers that tell the OS how exactly to load this file into memory. In iOS, the Mach-O (Mach Object) format is used for the same purposes. Mach-O performs the exact same task, but is structured somewhat differently. While a PE file is divided into rigid sections, the Mach-O structure is split into three main parts: the header, load commands, and segments with sections (_DATA). To quickly and get straight to the point on how the XNU kernel itself parses this format, it is enough to look at the structure of the main Mach-O header from the kernel sources (mach/mach_o.h). It is with this header that XNU begins parsing any binary or kext —
Code:
 
struct mach_header_64 {
    uint32_t magic;        // MH_MAGIC_64
    cpu_type_t cputype;    // CPU architecture
    cpu_subtype_t cpusubtype;
    uint32_t filetype;     // file type (MH_KEXT_BUNDLE for kexts)
    uint32_t ncmds;
    uint32_t sizeofcmds;   // total size of all load commands in bytes
    uint32_t flags;        // binary build and link flags
    uint32_t reserved;
};
 
 
The XNU kernel reads the first bytes of the file, encounters magic, and realizes it is dealing with a valid Mach-O. Then it looks at ncmds and sizeofcmds, which tell the kernel how many load commands are located right after this header and how many bytes of memory need to be read to parse them all. It is within these load commands that the entire driver assembly instructions in memory are hidden.
 
Without going too deep, let's list the most important things (segments, etc.) — the structure into which any Mach-O file breaks down after the header and load commands. As researchers, we are interested in three main segments:
 
The __TEXT segment is pure code. Here lie all the driver's executable instructions, functions, and logic. This segment has read-only and execute (R-X) permissions, meaning it cannot be directly overwritten in memory.
 
The __DATA segment houses global variables, static data, and various pointers. This segment is open for read and write (RW-), and it is precisely here that targets for pointer overwriting are often sought in order to hijack the kernel's execution flow.
 
The __LINKEDIT segment contains raw info for the dynamic linker, including symbol tables, function addresses, and data for relocating the binary when loading it into memory.

[Image: 686656618-b4a594de-56ba-49af-806e-db866b...WHETxyQBWQ]

Inside each of these segments are smaller building blocks — sections (for example, __text inside the __TEXT segment or __bss inside __DATA). For the XNU kernel, these segments serve as a memory map: it looks at them and understands which parts of the kext need to be made executable and which ones writable. I described this briefly since this is an introductory article
 XNU Kernel Initialization
 A hybrid XNU kernel operates in iOS devices; it is called hybrid because it contains components of the Mach microkernel and the FreeBSD monolithic system, as well as the object-oriented I/O Kit environment for driver development. The Mach part is responsible for lower-level tasks relative to the FreeBSD part; a great example is virtual memory management, virtual memory allocation, working with processes and threads, and describing the process address space (vm_map). For example, the simplest memory operation looks as follows using the SDK —
Code:
 
#include "mach/arm/vm_types.h"
#include "printf.hpp"
#include "mach/mach.h"

static kern_return_t read_memory(vm_map_t target_task, vm_address_t target_address, vm_size_t size, void** out_buffer) {
    vm_offset_t local_data_addr = 0;
    mach_msg_type_number_t data_count = 0;

    kern_return_t vmes = vm_read(target_task, target_address, size, &local_data_addr, &data_count); // reading memory

    if (vmes == KERN_SUCCESS) {
        *out_buffer = reinterpret_cast<void*>(local_data_addr);
    }
    return vmes;
}

int main() {
    void* buffer = nullptr;
    vm_size_t size = 0x4000;

    kern_return_t kr = read_memory(mach_task_self(), 0x1000050000, size, &buffer);
 
    if (kr == KERN_SUCCESS) {
        uint32_t* data_ptr = reinterpret_cast<uint32_t*>(buffer);
        printf("addr = %p", buffer);
        vm_deallocate(mach_task_self(), reinterpret_cast<vm_address_t>(buffer), size);
    }
    return 0;
}
 
Now let's talk about processes. At the Mach level, there is no concept of a process as we normally know it; everything revolves around specific structures. The FreeBSD layer, on the other hand, takes these low-level building blocks and turns them into user-space-friendly processes with PIDs, file descriptors, and network sockets.

Furthermore, the FreeBSD part is responsible for such crucial functions as the implementation of the Virtual File System (VFS), POSIX system call compatibility, the network stack (sockets), and security model management (including access permissions, UID/GID, and MAC policies). This is precisely why the kernel is called hybrid. The source code of the XNU kernel has long been available on GitHub, as Apple has open-sourced most of meridional and essential components, though naturally not protection mechanisms like AMFI, which we will analyze in subsequent parts of these articles. Link —
https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu

Now, directly regarding the kernel initialization process itself. The initial initialization of the kernel begins with iBoot handing over control to it, which we already know. By this point, the bootloader has already performed the necessary checks, prepared the data for startup, and passed information about the device's hardware configuration to the kernel. Now the main task shifts directly to XNU. Here is the code from the osfmk/arm64/start.s file, which handles this exact basic hardware preparation at the moment of the jump from the bootloader.
The processor first performs several basic operations necessary for the further operation of the kernel. Let's break them down in order —
 
Code:
 

 
[code]
.globl EXT(reset_vector) LEXT(reset_vector) msr OSLAR_EL1, xzr msr DAIFSet, #(DAIFSC_ALL) adrp x0, EXT(LowExceptionVectorBase)@page add x0, x0, EXT(LowExceptionVectorBase)@pageoff msr VBAR_EL1, x0
 
Let's start with DAIFSet. The processor may encounter various events that require a very fast response. For example, a hardware interrupt from a device may arrive, or an exception may occur during instruction execution. In such cases, the processor needs to hand over control to a special handler that will handle the situation, but the problem is that at the very start of the kernel, the necessary handlers might not be ready yet. Therefore, XNU temporarily masks the corresponding exceptions and interrupts, meaning the processor will not yet hand over control to their handlers in the usual way. In short, this is necessary so that the processor knows where to transfer control when exceptions occur, and also does not try to process interrupts at a time when the kernel has not yet finished basic initialization

Immediately after this, the most important part begins: the kernel needs to obtain boot parameters from iBoot and prepare the memory so that the processor can actually execute high-level code. Since XNU is compiled to work in the kernel virtual address space (KVA), and the processor is currently in the physical address space with the MMU turned off, XNU receives the parameters passed by the bootloader, specifically the boot_args structure, a pointer to which in the startup code under consideration is located in register x20. It contains the information necessary for initial initialization, including the physical and virtual base of the kernel and the memory size. Ultimately, it all comes down to the kernel simply needing to enable the MMU and jump from physical memory to virtual memory. By the way, in modern iOS versions, it is precisely that same SPTM we mentioned at the very beginning that is responsible for MMU initialization and memory mapping. But so as not to break our heads right now, we will analyze all these subtleties regarding SPTM and memory protection in detail a bit later
 
Subchapter. IOKit is a framework for developing kernel extensions.
[Image: 686656614-11f69e3e-a83e-4b2d-b9c7-03d41c...9D7Ft-lsVQ][Image: 686656614-11f69e3e-a83e-4b2d-b9c7-03d41c...9D7Ft-lsVQ] [Image: 686656614-11f69e3e-a83e-4b2d-b9c7-03d41c...Hy6lRJDTMY]
 
 
If you come from the Windows world, you most likely know what a driver is. A driver is a PE format executable file that extends the capabilities of the kernel, allowing it to interact with new hardware or perform low-level tasks. In iOS, things are different. The equivalent of drivers in this OS are kernel extensions (kexts). A kext is described by the Mach-O format, much like conditionally dynamic libraries. A kext itself can be called a whole bundle, meaning a structured folder. And if you look inside any kext, there will always be a utility Info.plist file that allows you to get information regarding the kext itself — it specifies the unique identifier of the extension, its version, and a list of dependencies via the OSBundleLibraries key, meaning other kexts that must be loaded into memory for our kext to even boot up. In addition, through the OSBundleRequired key, the system understands at what stage of the iOS boot process this specific module needs to be pulled in (for example, the sandbox.kext is needed for mounting the file system, so it is loaded first).
 
In the Windows world, you might have observed a situation where an attacker could execute kernel functions through a poorly written driver. The poor implementation consisted, in particular, of the Windows driver handling IOCTL requests poorly and incorrectly. And this poor implementation implies that the driver misconfigured ACL permissions, meaning the groups in the OS that have the rights to open a driver handle and send IOCTLs. In iOS and the I/O Kit framework, the logic is largely similar, but with its own peculiarities; the role of IOCTL requests here is played by the methods of the IOUserClient class, through which user space applications communicate with drivers. And if the kext developers messed up with access permissions or checks inside these methods, it becomes a goldmine for a researcher. The main difference is that instead of IOCTL, the term selector is used. A selector is the numeric index of the method we want to invoke inside the IOUserClient of a specific driver. In Windows, a special IOCTL code is sent to communicate with a driver, while in iOS everything is arranged through calls to functions like IOConnectCallMethod. That is precisely where this very selector is passed.
 
The kernel accepts the request, compares the index against the driver's internal method table, and passes arguments to it. When searching for vulnerabilities, this greatly simplifies life, because you can simply brute-force these selectors, feed malformed data into them, and observe. Or you can simply manually analyze kexts, which in itself is a very interesting chance to get a kernel write primitive. The prototype of the IOConnectCallMethod function from the SDK looks as follows. We will also analyze the main parameters that are of interest to us here —
Code:
 

 
[code]
kern_return_t IOConnectCallMethod( mach_port_t connection, uint32_t selector, const io_scalar_inband_t *input, uint32_t inputCnt, const void *inputStruct, size_t inputStructCnt, io_scalar_inband_t *output, uint32_t *outputCnt, void *outputStruct, size_t *outputStructCnt );
[/code]
 
  • connection is a mach port (mach_port_t), which represents an open connection descriptor to the driver. It can be obtained through the IOServiceOpen function. Without this port, the kernel will not even listen to us
  • selector is that very numerical index of the driver method we talked about above. It is precisely by this number that I/O Kit understands which specific function inside the kernel we are trying to poke
  • input and inputCnt are an array of simple 64-bit numbers (scalars) that are passed to the driver as regular arguments, along with their count
  • inputStruct and inputStructCnt are a pointer to raw data (a structure) and its size. This is a super-important field for bug hunting, because it is right here that we can stuff a complex structure with malformed flags, negative sizes, or overly long strings in an attempt to trigger a kernel buffer overflow
  • output/outputStruct are buffers where the kernel will write the response after method execution if the driver needs to return something back to user space
In Windows specifically, when a driver receives an IOCTL in IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL, it has a function that extracts input data from the buffer, checks its size, and redirects it to the appropriate handler. Typically, this looks like a massive switch-case statement. This classic flawed pattern in C++ looks approximately like this —
Code:
 
[code]
DriverObject->MajorFunction[0] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_11006; DriverObject->MajorFunction[2] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_11006; DriverObject->MajorFunction[14] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_121DE; // IOCTL
[/code]
Code:
 

 
[code]

 
[code]
rwdrv.sys MasterIrp = Irp->AssociatedIrp.MasterIrp; Irp->IoStatus.Status = 0; v3->IoStatus.Information = 0; v5 = *(_DWORD *)(v2 + 40); CurrentStackLocation = v3->Tail.Overlay.CurrentStackLocation; if ( CurrentStackLocation->MajorFunction == 14 ) { LowPart = CurrentStackLocation->Parameters.Read.ByteOffset.LowPart; switch ( LowPart ) { case 2238472: v8 = sub_110CC(a1: MasterIrp); v3->IoStatus.Status = v8; if ( v8 >= 0 ) goto LABEL_4; break; case 2238476: v9 = sub_1114C(a1: MasterIrp); goto LABEL_6; case 2238480: v13 = __inbyte(MasterIrp->Type); LOBYTE(MasterIrp->MdlAddress) = v13; goto LABEL_17; case 2238484: Type = MasterIrp->Type; MdlAddress = (unsigned __int8)MasterIrp->MdlAddress; goto LABEL_21; case 2238488: v14 = __inword(MasterIrp->Type); LOWORD(MasterIrp->MdlAddress) = v14; goto LABEL_17; case 2238492: v18 = MasterIrp->Type; Flags = (unsigned __int16)MasterIrp->MdlAddress; goto LABEL_23; case 2238496: v15 = (struct _MDL *)__indword(MasterIrp->Type); MasterIrp->MdlAddress = v15; goto LABEL_17; case 2238500: v20 = MasterIrp->Type; v21 = (unsigned int)MasterIrp->MdlAddress; goto LABEL_25; case 2238504: __outbyte(MasterIrp->Type, MasterIrp->Flags); v22 = __inbyte((unsigned __int16)MasterIrp->MdlAddress); MasterIrp->AssociatedIrp.IrpCount = v22; goto LABEL_15; case 2238508: __outbyte(MasterIrp->Type, MasterIrp->Flags); Type = (unsigned __int16)MasterIrp->MdlAddress; MdlAddress = (unsigned __int8)MasterIrp->AssociatedIrp.MasterIrp; goto LABEL_21;

In iOS and the I/O Kit framework, this logic works in a similar way, but much more structured. Instead of writing huge switch-case statements manually and digging parameters out of buffers on their own, kext developers use a special array of dispatch structures, IOExternalMethodDispatch. In the kext code, this usually looks like a table where rules are defined for each selector —
Code:
 
const IOExternalMethodDispatch MyDriver::sMethods[kMyDriverMethodCount] = {
    {
        // selector 0
        (IOExternalMethodAction) &MyDriver::methodZero,
        0,              // number of input scalars (inputCnt)
        sizeof(MyData), // input structure size (inputStructCnt)
        0,              // number of output scalars
        0               // output structure size
    },
    {
        // selector 1
        (IOExternalMethodAction) &MyDriver::methodOne,
        2,              // expect strictly 2 scalars
        0,              // structure not needed
        0,
        0
    }
};
 
When we call IOConnectCallMethod from user space, the XNU kernel itself takes this table, finds the required selector, and automatically checks the sizes of the data we passed (inputCnt and inputStructCnt) for compliance with the rules from the array. If we passed a structure of a smaller size than specified in the table, the kernel will simply reject the request before it even reaches the driver method. Bugs still happen even in such cases—for example, kext developers might accidentally specify kIOUCVariableStructureSize in the table (which means a variable structure size) and forget to check the actual data length inside the method itself. Or they might handle the logic incorrectly inside the function when one structure field affects the parsing of another field. These are precisely the places researchers look for during IOUserClient audits
[Image: 686656616-114dd6d4-c7b4-4ef9-9234-fdad1a...kBXL_TWlRM]

All kexts inside the XNU kernel are prelinked. What does this mean? It means they are combined into one massive monolithic binary during the system build stage on Apple servers. This ready-made image is called the kernelcache. In traditional desktop operating systems, drivers reside on disk as separate files and are loaded into memory dynamically as needed. On iOS, this was abandoned due to strict security and boot speed requirements. When building the firmware, a special utility takes the kernel itself and all official extensions, resolves all dependencies between them, matches function addresses, and stitches them into a single cache. When the device powers on, iBoot loads this entire ready-made kernelcache into memory. For us as researchers, this means two things. First, we cannot simply take and slip a third-party kext to the system, because the kernel does not know how to dynamically load arbitrary code from disk. Second, for vulnerability research, we have to download the firmware, unpack this huge kernelcache, and reverse engineer it entirely in IDA or Ghidra, extracting the necessary drivers by their metadata and strings. I think we are done with I/O Kit!
 MACF callbacks
 MACF is a Mandatory Access Control Framework built deep into the XNU kernel. You could say it acts as the chief authority of the iOS operating system, controlling any potentially dangerous process actions. Certain kexts that ensure security operate on top of MACF. It provides the XNU kernel with a massive set of hooks for any operations — file opening, process creation, socket operations, IPC, and memory mapping.
 Let's draw an analogy with Windows. In Windows, security software registers its handlers through APIs like ObRegisterCallbacks (for controlling process handles), CmRegisterCallbackEx (for tracking registry operations), or PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine. When a user-space process attempts to perform a dangerous action, the Windows kernel first triggers this callback, giving the security driver a chance to block the operation.
 In iOS, the logic is identical. When a user-space application makes a system call, the XNU kernel does not execute it immediately. It first runs the request through a chain of registered MACF policies. The most prominent modules that subscribe to these hooks are precisely the security kexts sandbox.kext and AppleMobileFileIntegrity.kext (AMFI). They check the process's action against its permissions and decide whether to allow the operation or issue a denial. Callback registration occurs through the mac_policy_register function; you can observe the function prototype below —
Code:
 

 
[code]
#ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif typedef unsigned int mac_policy_handle_t; int mac_policy_register( struct mac_policy_conf *mpc, mac_policy_handle_t *handlep, void *xd ); int mac_policy_unregister( mac_policy_handle_t handle ); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif
[/code]
 
First is a pointer to your policy configuration structure, which specifies the module's name. Second is a pointer to an unsigned int variable where the kernel will write the unique descriptor of the registered policy. This is required for its subsequent unregistration via mac_policy_unregister. By the way, the unregistration prototype looks as follows —
Code:
[code]
[code]
#include <security/mac_policy.h>

int mac_policy_unregister(mac_policy_handle_t handle);

 
[/code]
[/code]
 
 
As I already mentioned, this framework is used to enforce security and is heavily utilized by Apple across both iOS and macOS

 
iOS 17 and hello SPTM/TXM!
 
Finally, something really interesting. Specifically, I analyzed two modules myself, although this article is an introduction, I will indicate the sources where I verified my own guesses:
1. https://www.alphaxiv.org/ru/abs/2510.09272
2. https://support.apple.com/ru-ru/guide/security/sec8b776536b/web
3. https://df-f.com/blog/ios17
Introduction

Imagine a scenario where both PPL and SPTM/TXM are absent. An attacker has a write primitive into the XNU kernel's address space. In such a case, crucial security mechanisms—including MACF structures and associated callback functions—essentially reside within the exact same kernel address space and lack a separate hardware-protected isolation tier. At the same time, security policy checks, including code signature enforcement and sandbox policy enforcement, depend precisely on such mechanisms. As a result, having arbitrary kernel memory write capability potentially allows an attacker to modify the corresponding structures and callback function pointers—up to zeroing them out or replacing them entirely. In other words, upon obtaining a kernel write primitive, the attacker gains the ability to directly tamper with the implementation of security policies, since this logic itself is hosted within the kernel address space protected only at the EL1 level

Prior to iOS 17, the system used a protection mechanism called PPL (Page Protected Layer). This was a hardware-software security mechanism designed to isolate critically important memory page tables, ensuring that even a compromised kernel could not directly modify protected memory regions and thereby interfere with mechanisms responsible for system security. However, PPL had a fundamental flaw: despite having an additional layer of protection, the mechanism itself executed within the kernel context. This meant that bugs in its implementation or in its interaction logic with the kernel could potentially lead to bypassing the intended restrictions. Researchers actually discovered such issues, including CVEs related to bypassing or violating memory protection mechanisms.
  • CVE-2023-38606 is the most illustrative example. The vulnerability allowed obtaining a physical memory write via hardware MMIO registers and bypassing PPL. It was used in the Operation Triangulation exploit chain and patched in iOS 16.6.
As a result, in iOS 17 Apple decided to substantially overhaul the page table protection architecture and replace PPL with two new protection mechanisms:
  1. TXM (Trust Execution Monitor) — a privileged component that performs checks and operations related to the system's protected security mechanisms;
  2. SPTM (Secure Page Table Monitor) — a mechanism responsible for controlling page table operations and critically important memory regions.
Following the introduction of these mechanisms, Apple significantly complicated the construction of exploitation chains for spyware developers. As a rule, modern spyware is not a single vulnerability, but a sequence of exploits, each allowing a transition to the next privilege level. Previously, a typical chain might have looked like this —

[Image: 686656617-45468d63-93cd-4f22-9cc9-051851...0ot8Heo45E]
 With the advent of SPTM and TXM, this scheme has become significantly more complex. Even upon obtaining a kernel write primitive, an attacker no longer achieves the previous level of control over critical memory structures—operations on protected regions are additionally controlled by mechanisms residing outside the ordinary trusted kernel. As a result, a single successful kernel exploit is no longer sufficient; the attacker must find a way to bypass this new security tier as well. This is precisely what substantially increases the cost and difficulty of building a fully-fledged iOS exploitation chain.
 Now, as of 2026, according to my analysis of iOS 26.5, the mechanisms related to digital code signature verification (AMFI) and sandbox policy enforcement are implemented within the protected TXM context. Accordingly, the regular XNU kernel does not have direct access to TXM protected memory and cannot simply modify the structures or callback functions located there. Let us now dive deeper into this and study the fundamentals, starting with memory management and page tables in XNU.

 Memory Management in XNU

 Leaving aside Apple's custom hardware protections, the basic concept of memory management in XNU differs very little from standard Linux or a typical NT kernel: under the hood, we always live with a dualism—physical hardware (RAM sticks) and virtual abstractions that the kernel presents to processes. When a compiler builds an executable file in Mach-O format for iOS, base virtual addresses for each binary segment (__TEXT, __DATA, __LINKEDIT) are hardcoded into its headers (specifically Load Commands, LC_SEGMENT_64). For instance, the loader sees a starting address of 0x1000050000. The process ge
  • o. 1 => 0x1000050000
  • Page No. 2 => 0x1000054000
  • Page No. 3 => 0x1000058000
You can safely execute a standard memcpy() of 0xC000 bytes (exactly 3 pages), copying data in a single pass, and the program won't even notice. But if we remove the virtualization mask and look into the physical RAM cells, we will see that these three pages are scattered across the memory chip in an absolute chaotic order:
  • Virtual Page No. 1 maps to physical 0x800004000
  • Virtual Page No. 2 flies off to the complete other end - 0x8018C0000
  • Virtual Page No. 3 lands on 0x8000C4000
Processes can work with contiguous memory regions and predefined base addresses. When a pointer to a virtual address is dereferenced, this address is translated into a physical one, from which reading or writing is then performed nuinely believes that its memory starts right here and belongs entirely to it
 
The physical address spectrum of RAM in Apple devices is tightly bound to the architecture of a specific SoC—the so-called DRAM_BASE (historically, in many Apple A-series chips, it originated from the 0x800000000 region, although in modern Apple Silicon revisions it is shifted higher). If two different processes attempted to write simultaneously to the exact same hardcoded address like 0x1000050000, the system would immediately crash into a kernel panic due to overlapping and overwriting each other's data.
 To prevent this, XNU slices all memory into chunks called pages. In iOS, the standard page size is 16 KB (0x4000 hex bytes), unlike the classical 4 KB in x86 architectures or older Apple chips prior to the A8 processor. The transition to 16 KB pages allowed Apple to reduce TLB cache pressure. An example of virtual memory operation:
  • Page No. 1 => 0x1000050000
  • Page No. 2 => 0x1000054000
  • Page No. 3 => 0x1000058000
You can safely execute a standard memcpy() of 0xC000 bytes (exactly 3 pages), copying data in a single pass, and the program won't even notice. But if we remove the virtualization mask and look into the physical RAM cells, we will see that these three pages are scattered across the memory chip in an absolute chaotic order:
  • Virtual Page No. 1 maps to physical 0x800004000
  • Virtual Page No. 2 flies off to the complete other end - 0x8018C0000
  • Virtual Page No. 3 lands on 0x8000C4000
Processes can work with contiguous memory regions and predefined base addresses. When a pointer to a virtual address is dereferenced, this address is translated into a physical one, from which reading or writing is then performed.

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